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Vestiges of Legal Protectionism:
The Successor Attorney
In our complex and interdependent society, human relations are constantly being fit into a framework of legal rights and responsibilities,
and in this process, the role of the attorney has become increasingly
crucial.' As more individuals come to depend upon the attorney, his

role must broaden and deepen to meet the additional social responsibil-

ity.2 A subject upon which divergent opinion has been expressed

among various American jurisdictions is the extent of liability that an
attorney incurs to third parties while acting on behalf of a client.3 The

traditional view is that an attorney can not be held liable to a third
person with whom he is not in privity, and thus, to whom he owes no
legal duty of care.4 This traditional view has been modified or abol-

ished in many states.5

Under present 'California law, the determination of whether a duty

undertaken by an attorney extends to a third party not in privity involves a balancing of factors, including the extent to which the plaintiff
was intended to be affected by the transaction, the foreseeability of
harm to plaintiff, the certainty that plaintiff was injured, the closeness
of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, the

moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of
preventing future harm.6 In general, an attorney's liability to third persons is restricted to those who are intended beneficiaries of the performance of a duty by the attorney.7 This comment will examine one
aspect of the present controversy surrounding the issue of an attorney's
liability to third parties-the successor attorney situation.
1. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194, 491 P.2d 421,
432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848-49 (1971).
2. Id.
3. See Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109, 128 Cal.
•Rptr. 901, 904 (1976). See generally Note, Attorneys' Negligence and ThirdParties, 57 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 126 (1982).
4. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); see also Goodman v.
Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 342, 556 P.2d 737, 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1976); Wallach & Kelly,
Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 257, 262-63. See
generally Note, supra note 3.
5. See Note, supra note 3, at 126, 132-44.
6. See supra note 4; see also Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
7. See, e.g., Goodman, 18 Cal. 3d at 342-44, 556 P.2d at 742-43, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81
(1976); see also Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 228, 449 P.2d 161, 164, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228
(1969). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 138-44.
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Simply defined, the successor attorney situation arises when an attorney (Attorney I) sued for malpractice by a former client, alleges that

the client's present attorney (Attorney II, the successor attorney) negligently managed the client's interests following Attorney I's initial act of
malpractice.' As the result of Attorney II's negligence, the damages for
which the client seeks to hold Attorney I fully responsible are en-

hanced. 9 To avoid liability for the portion of the client's loss that may
be attributed to the conduct of Attorney II, Attorney I desires to cross-

claim against Attorney II in the malpractice action brought against him
by the former client.10

Two distinct theories of recovery should be available to Attorney I in
these circumstances. First, Attorney I should be permitted to cross-

claim against Attorney II for professional negligence, alleging that Attorney II breached a legal duty of care owed Attorney I as a foreseeable

plaintiff." Attorney I's second theory of recovery is for comparative
indemnity, 2 as promulgated by the California Supreme Court in American MotorcycleAssn. v. Superior Court. 3 Relying upon the principles
of comparative negligence adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab, 4 the court in
American Motorcycle modified the common law doctrine of equitable

indemnity to permit apportionment of liability among multiple
tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.' 5 To cross-claim against At-

torney II for comparative indemnity, Attorney I need merely allege
that Attorney II breached the legal duty of care owed to the client,

exacerbating the client's damages.

6

If the client is successful in his suit

8. See Held v. Arant, 67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 750, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422, 423, hearing denied
(1977);see also Gibson, Dunn & Crutcherv. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 347, 349-51, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 327-28, hearingdenied (1979); Parker v. Morton, 117 Cal. App. 3d 751,754-55, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 197, 198-99 (1981); Goldfisher v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 12, 23, 183 Cal. Rptr.
609, 615 (1982).
9. See id.
10. See supra note 8.
11. See Gibson, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 357-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34 (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting); f Goodman, 18 Cal. 3d at 350-54, 556 P.2d at 747-49, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87 (Mosk.
J., dissenting) (although not a successor attorney situation, the court reasons that the absence of a
direct service to or intent to benefit a third party does not preclude an attorney's liability). But see
Held, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23.
12. See American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 583-84, 578 P.2d 899,
902, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (1978). The court uses the terms "comparative indemnity" and "partial indemnity" interchangeably throughout its opinion. To avoid confusing the reader, this Comment will use only the term "comparative indemnity." See generally infra notes 148-285 and
accompanying text.
13. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
14. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
15. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 901-02, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85
(1978).
16. The standard used to determine whether a cause of action for equitable indemnity lies
has been the subject of varying interpretation and application. As the court in American Motorcy)cle noted:
Dean Prosser was at a loss in attempting to state the applicable standard: "Out of all
this, it is extremely difficult to state any general rule or principle as to when indemnity
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against Attorney I, Attorney II should then indemnify Attorney I for
the amount of damages attributable to Attorney II's negligent

conduct. 17
With few exceptions, courts have refused to permit Attorney I to
cross-claim against Attorney II on either a negligence or a comparative
indemnity theory.' Whether these claims should be allowed has not
been decided by the California Supreme Court. The purpose of this
comment is to examine why the denial of an attorney's cross-claim for

professional negligence or comparative indemnity filed against a successor attorney unnecessarily perpetuates a practice that will be re-

ferred to by this author as "legal protectionism."
As will be demonstrated in this comment, a successor attorney
should not be insulated from having to bear full responsibility for the

consequences of his negligent conduct. The immunization of a successor attorney from liability can be justified neither by a refusal to find a
duty owed predecessor attorney, 19 nor by an unwillingness to apply the
doctrine of comparative indemnity.2" By expanding the concepts of le-

gal duty of care2 ' and adopting principles of comparative fault,22 the
courts have underscored the primary importance of holding an individual responsible for the harm which he negligently inflicts upon others.2 3
An attorney should not be afforded special treatment when faced
with the consequences of his negligent conduct merely because of his

membership in the legal profession.

4

Certainly, strong arguments sup-

port judicial consideration of the unique nature of the attorney-client

relationship in situations where an attorney's liability for professional
negligence is at issue.25 Arguments for precluding attorney liability
must be carefully weighed against the policies that favor ensuring indiwill be allowed and when it will not. It has been said that it is permitted only where the
indemnitor has owed a duty of his own to the indemnitee; that it is based on a 'great
difference' in the gravity of the fault of the two tortfeasors; or that it rests upon a disproportionate or difference in character of the duties owed by the two to the injured plaintiff. Probably none of these is the complete answer.....
. . .[Tlhe duty to indemnify will be recognized in cases where community opinion
would consider that in justice the responsibility should rest upon one rather than the
other. This may be because of the relation of the parties to one another, and the consequent duty owed; or it may be because of a significant difference in the kind or quality of
their conduct.
20 Cal. 3d at 594-95 n.4, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
17. See generally infra notes 241-285 and accompanying text.
18. See Gola)Fsher, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
19. See infra notes 92-148 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 241-85 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Goodman, 18 Cal. 3d at 350-54, 556 P.2d at 747-49, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87
(Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 194, 491 P.2d at 432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
25. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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vidual responsibility for negligent conduct.2 6
This comment focuses on the public policy arguments that have been
advanced to support and refute the desirability of permitting an attorney to cross-claim against his successor. The author takes the position
that Attorney I should be allowed to cross-claim against Attorney II for
both professional negligence 27 and comparative indemnity. 2 8 Because
of the compelling nature of the public policies supporting these
claims, 29 the existence of the attorney-client relationship should not
serve as an insurmountable barrier to attaining a desirable and equitable result."
The two causes of action available to Attorney I are addressed in
separate sections of this comment, the first section focusing on the
cross-claim for professional negligence. An analysis of the comparative
indemnity cause of action will follow. In both of these sections, the
background, general development, and case law concerning the application of the respective causes of action to the successor attorney situation will be examined. A discussion of the public policy considerations
involved in permitting an attorney to cross-claim against a successor
attorney concludes each section.
CROSS-CLAIM FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE

Few decisions have discussed the propriety of an attorney's crossclaim for professional negligence against a successor attorney.3 I In
those cases in which the issue has been reached, the courts have disallowed the claim, based on a determination that Attorney II owed no
legal duty of care to Attorney 1.32 Since the element of duty in a cause
of action for negligence has presented the most obstinate hurdle for
courts to cross in deciding to impose liability upon a successor attorney,
this section will be confined primarily to a discussion of the duty issue.
A.

Background

When an attorney accepts employment to give legal advice or to
render legal services, he impliedly agrees to use ordinary skill, judgment, care and diligence in the performance of the tasks he under26. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 92-148 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 241-85 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 92-148 and 241-285 and accompanying text.
30. See Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 946-53, 155
Cal. Rptr. 393, 401-05 (1979) (Cologne, Acting P.J., dissenting).
31. See Held, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423; see also Parker, 177 Cal. App. 3d
at 758-67, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 201-06; GolaWsher, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 15-23, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15.
32. See, e.g., 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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takes.33 Traditionally, an attorney's liability for the negligent
performance of his professional duties has extended only to his client,
and not to third parties injured by the attorney's conduct arising out of
the professional relationship with the client.34 The basis for the refusal
of courts to extend liability to third parties has been the concept of
privity of contract. 35 For many years, an allegedly negligent attorney's
liability was effectively confined to his or her client on the theory that
in the absence of privity, a tortfeasor owes no duty to an injured
plaintiff.

36

California courts were among the first to expand attorney liability.37
In the decision of Biakanja v. Irving,38 the California Supreme Court
rejected the privity requirement by finding that a notary public owed a
duty of care to the intended beneficiary of an improperly attested
will.39 Three years later, the court in Lucas v. Harem,40 expanded an
attorney's liability to third parties by stating that a testator's attorney
could owe a duty of care to the beneficiary of a will.4 ' As subsequently

explained in Heyer v. F1aig,42 "when an attorney undertakes to fulfill
the testamentary instructions of his client, he realistically and in fact
assumes a relationship not only with the client, but also with the client's
intended beneficiaries. 43 It is this relationship that creates the duty of'
care owed by the attorney. 44
The existence of a legal duty of care is an essential element of tort
liability.45 Whether an attorney owes a duty of care to a third person is
the first determination that must be made before liability can be
found.46 The issue of duty is a question of law, and depends upon a
judicial weighing of the policy considerations for and against the imposition of liability under the circumstances.47 As the California
33. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591,364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 525 (1962).
34. See Note, supra note 3, at 126.
35. Id. at 126, 132-137.
36. Id. at 135-37; see also Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19 (1958).
37. See Note, supra note 3, at 135-36, 139.
38. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
39. Id. at 650-51, 320 P.2d at 18-19.
40. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821.
41. Id. at 591, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
42. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
43. Id. at 228, 449 P.2d at 164, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
44. Id; see also 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Attorneys §144, at 154-55 (2d ed.
1970).
45. Nava v. McMillan, 123 Cal. App. 3d 262, 265, 176 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475 (1981); 4 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §5, at 2306 (8th ed. 1974).
46. See 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381; see also Morales v. Field,
DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 99 Cal.App. 3d 307, 315, 160 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243,hearingdenied
(1979).
47. 18 Cal. 3d at 342, 556 P.2d at 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 380. As stated by William L. Prosser
in LAW OF TORTS §53 (4th ed. 1971):
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Supreme Court initially stated in Biakanja:4 8
[T]he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
49
the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.

When considering the issue of whether an attorney's duty of care
extends to third persons not in privity, California courts have limited
attorney liability to third parties who are intended beneficiaries of the
attorney's actions.5 0 An attorney's duty of care should not be so restricted. When a balancing of the Biakanja policy factors favors extending an attorney's liability to third parties, a duty should be

recognized."

In general, absent overriding policy factors, an attorney's

duty of care should extend to any person who might foreseeably be
injured by the attorney's negligent conduct. 2
The Duty Issue De~fned

B.

The following analysis focuses specifically on the duty issue
presented when an attorney (Attorney I), sued for malpractice by his
former client, seeks to cross-claim against the attorney (Attorney II)
subsequently retained by the client to extricate him from the situation
created by Attorney I's negligence. This factual situation was first
before the California courts in the case of Held v. Arant,5 3 decided by
the Second District Court of Appeal. In that case, an attorney (Attor-

ney I) was sued by his former client for legal malpractice. 54 The client
alleged that Attorney I's negligent representation of him in the negotiation and drafting of an agreement resulted in the client being sued for
[I]t should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.

48. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16.
49. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
50. See, e.g., 18 Cal. 3d at 342-43, 556 P.2d at 742-43, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81; see also 67
Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423; Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg, 77 Cal. App. 3d 60, 68,
143 Cal. Rptr. 389, 393 (1978).
51. See 18 Cal. 3d at 353, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387; see also infra notes 92-148
and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
53. 67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422, hearing denied (1977).
54. The elements of an action for professional negligence are: (1) a duty of the professional
to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess
and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's
negligence. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (1971), 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852.
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misrepresentation in inducing the agreement.5 5 Attorney I sought to
cross-claim against the attorneys (Attorney II) whom the client subsequently retained to represent him in the misrepresentation action. The
theory proposed in the defendant's cross-claim was that the subsequent
attorneys were negligent in advising the client to settle legally defensible claims in the misrepresentation action. 5 6 As a result, Attorney I
claimed to have suffered damage in being exposed to liability for malpractice and injury to his professional career. 7
The Held court, relying upon earlier appellate decisions restricting
an attorney's duty of care to intended beneficiaries," quickly dismissed
the defendant's cross-complaint for negligence and devoted primary attention to the issue of equitable indemnity. Although the focus of the
decision was on the indemnity issue, the policy considerations underlying a judicial determination of whether Attorney II owes a legal duty of
care to Attorney I are the same. 9 The primary policy consideration
cited by the Held court in support of the dismissal of Attorney I's cross
complaint was essentially preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship.6 ° The court reasoned that imposing upon a successor attorney the duty to act with reasonable care toward Attorney I would
impermissibly impinge upon the undivided loyalty Attorney II owes his
client.6 '

Comparing the successor attorney situation with the situation
presented when a physician seeks to treat a patient for injuries caused
by a prior tortfeasor, the Held court reasoned that the peculiar nature
of the attorney-client relationship precludes the imposition of a duty
upon Attorney 11.62 In the case of a negligent physician, the possibility
that the physician may be sued for indemnity by the initial tortfeasor
does not inhibit the physician's performance of his professional duty.63
In contrast, explained the court, when an attorney is retained to represent the interests of his client against persons who are actual or potential adversaries, the possibility that one of those adversaries may seek
indemnity from the attorney can impinge upon the attorney's duty of
undivided loyalty owed the client. Finding the possibility of a conflict
of interest that could detrimentally affect Attorney II's representation
55. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
56. Id. at 750-51, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (citing National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 45 Cal.
App. 3d 562, 565, 119 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (1975)).
59. See generally 18 Cal. 3d at 342-44, 556 P.2d at 743-44, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
60. See 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752-53, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
61. Id. at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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of the client, the Held court refused to permit Attorney I's crossclaim.'
The rationale advanced by the Held decision is clearly suspect.6" A
comparison of the influence that the threat of a lawsuit may have upon

a successor'physician in the treatment of his patient with the effect of
threatened litigation upon a successor attorney in the handling of his
client's affairs, reveals striking similarities. 6

The positions in which

the physician and the attorney may find themselves are essentially the
same. Both owe their respective patients and clients the highest duty of
good faith and fidelity. The possibility that the successor attorney
would choose a course of conduct other than one best designed to protect his client's interests if the alternative would be to subject himself to

a malpractice claim is the same possibility that exists when a successor
physician is presented with a similar choice.6 7

In the medical profession, the behavior that results when a physician
attempts to safeguard his own interests has been termed "defensive
medicine. ' 68 As the Held court recognized, this same defensive conduct can occur in the legal field.6 9 Special treatment, however, has

been afforded attorneys based solely upon the "peculiar nature" of the
attorney-client relationship.7" This preferential consideration has not
been available to members of the medical profession. In fact, some
jurisdictions subject physicians to strict liability for services provided.7"
Whether the restriction of the duty of care owed third persons by attor-

neys is justified when compared with the expanded liability of those
who practice medicine is a question beyond the scope of this comment.
Nonetheless, the analysis of the Held court comparing the duties owed
by attorneys and physicians should be open to criticism as being ex-

tremely narrow and lacking in substantial rational or empirical
support.
64. Id.
65. See 117 Cal. App. 3d at 759 n.2, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See generally Comment, MalpracticeSuits: The Increased Cost ofHealth Care, 8 TULSA
LJ.223, 227 (1972), inwhich the practice of defensive medicine is described as: "[t]he use of extra
diagnostic tests, the opinion of one or more consultants, and other defensive practices [which] may
safeguard the interest of the physician, but [which] must be paid for by the patient." The dimensions of the problem have also been described as follows:
[I]n the current malpractice climate, even the most competent physicians feel vulnerable to malpractice suits and are practicing defensive medicine. They freely admit that
they prescribe unnecessary x-rays and diagnostic tests, and that they tend to keep patents hospitalized longer than would otherwise be indicated.
Bemzweig, The Malpractice Crisis:=A GovernmentExpert's View, 39 INS. COUN. J. 24, 24-25 (1972).
69. See 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752-53, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
70. See id.
71. See generally Note, Strict Liability The Medical Malpractice Citadel Still Stands, 11
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1357 (1978).
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Following Held, the next case to discuss a successor attorney's duty,
though not directly, was that of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior
Court.72 In Gibson, Attorney I's cross-claim was solely one for comparative indemnity, and yet the court relied heavily upon Held, as well as
the California Supreme Court decision of Goodman v. Kennedy.7 3
Comparative indemnity was not discussed in Goodman. The issue was
whether an attorney's duty of care should extend to a third party who
deals with the attorney's client at arm's length.7 4
In Goodman, attorney-defendant Kennedy advised his clients, the
principal officers in a corporation, that shares of stock could be issued
to them as stock dividends and sold to third persons without jeopardizing the registration exemption requirement extending to purchasers of
the stock.7 5 Plaintiffs purchased stock from the clients. Later, when the
Securities and Exchange Commission suspended the exemption causing the value of the stock to depreciate, plaintiffs sought to hold attorney-defendant Kennedy liable. Plaintiffs theory of recovery included
damages for (1) the incorrect advice that Kennedy gave his own clients
and (2) conscious nondisclosure to the plaintiffs attorney of matters
that would have indicated the possibility of adverse consequences from
the stock purchase.7 6
Relying upon the intended beneficiary theory of Lucas v. Harm7 7
and Heyer v. Flaig,78 the plaintiffs argued that attorney Kennedy's duty
of care extended to them as third party beneficiaries of the advice Kennedy gave his clients.7 9 Not only was Kennedy's advice "intended to
affect" them as purchasers, but the harm plaintiffs suffered was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the attorney's alleged negligent
conduct. The California Supreme Court rejected the plaintifi's arguments on both factual and policy grounds. The court first noted the
absence of a relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant that
would create a duty of care to the plaintiffs.8 0 No allegation had been
made that Kennedy's advice was in fact communicated to or relied
upon by the plaintiffs, nor did the evidence support a conclusion that
the advice to the clients was given for the purpose of enabling the clients to discharge any obligation owed the plaintiffs. 8 1 Furthermore,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

94 Cal. App. 3d 347, 156 Cal. Rptr. 326, hearingdenied (1979).
18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
Id. at 339, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
Id.
Id. at 342, 556 P.2d at 741-42, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80.
56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821.
70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225.
18 Cal. 3d at 343-44, 556 P.2d at 742-43, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
Id.
Id.
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stated the court, undesirable self-protective reservations would be injected into the attorney's counseling role if an attorney were to be held
liable for negligent confidential advice not only to the client who enters
into a transaction in reliance upon the advice, but also to other parties
to the transaction with whom the client deals at arm's length. The attorney would be prevented from devoting his entire energies to the client's interests. As a result, an undue burden Would be placed upon the
legal profession, and the quality of legal services received by the client
would be diminished. 2
The reliance of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher upon Goodman and Held
arguably was misplaced, as Held may be viewed as wrongly decided
and Goodman may be clearly distinguished on its face from the successor attorney situation.8 3 The holding in Goodman therefore, should not
be interpreted as binding authority upon the specific issue here considered.8 4 Goodman may be distinguished in that the plaintiff stock purchasers were nonlawyers whose dealings with both the defendantattorney and the client had been strictly at arm's length." In contrast,
in the successor attorney situation, the plaintiff-client had dealt with
both Attorney II and the third party (Attorney I) in a fiduciary capacity. 6 The Goodman court expressly limited its holding to situations in
87
which the third party dealt with the attorney's client at arm's length.
Since Attorney I, as the third party in the successor attorney situation
was a fiduciary of the client, the Goodman rationale clearly does not
apply.
The decision rendered by the Goodman court was not unanimous.88
Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Tobriner in his dissent, emphasized the
factor of foreseeability, concluding that attorney Kennedy owed a duty
to the plaintiffs based on a balancing of the factors enumerated in
Biakanja.89 The refusal of the court to impose a duty upon an attorney
under the circumstances of Goodman, as viewed by the dissent, unfairly
penalized innocent persons whose injury was the foreseeable result of
the attorney's negligence. As a logical consequence of rejecting the
compulsive privity doctrine, Justice Mosk stated that an attorney
should be liable to third persons injured as the result of the attorney's
82. Id.
83. See generally supra note 8.
84. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 357-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34 (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting).
85. See 18 Cal. 3d at 339, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
86. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 357, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Jefferson (Bernard), J., dissenting); see also
Remainders, Inc. v. Bartlett, 215 Cal. App. 2d 295, 299, 30 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194 (1963).
87. 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
88. Id. at 350-54, 556 P.2d at 747-49, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87.
89. 18 Cal. 3d at 353, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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negligent advice to his client when that advice inevitably will harm the
other person. 90 Even though "gross extensions of liability. . . involving similar conduct and results, can be conjured up. . .," the dissent
concluded that "recovery under such fanciful circumstances could be
denied for remoteness." The liability of the attorney to third parties
should be limited to cases in which, like Goodman and Biakanja, the
only recourse of the injured party is to sue the negligent attorney. 9 1
Exactly how the Biakanja factors apply to the successor attorney situation is crucial to a determination of whether a court should permit
Attorney I's cross-claim for negligence against Attorney II. The section
that follows will demonstrate that the policy factors enumerated in
Biakanja strongly favor the existence of a duty owed by Attorney II to
Attorney I. Attorney I, therefore, should be allowed to cross-claim
against Attorney II for all damages proximately caused by Attorney II's
failure to exercise due care.
C. Application of the Biakanja Factors
The judicial restriction of an attorney's liability to intended beneficiaries of the attorney's conduct is without substantial justification in
the factual situation presented when Attorney I seeks to cross-claim
against Attorney II. The California Supreme Court in Biakanja listed
six factors to balance in determining whether a defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity.92 These factors are (1) the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the
foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future
harm.93
Many courts have interpreted the first of the Biakanja factors to imply that the third party must be an intended beneficiary of the attorneyclient relationship. 4 Without an intended beneficiary status, these
90. 18 Cal. 3d at 354, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
91. Id. at 353, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387. In Biakanja, the intended beneficiary
had no right of action against the estate, and his sole recourse was against the person who had
drafted the will. The plaintiffs in Goodman could not recover against the corporation or the corporation's principal officers, since the corporation's stock was without value and the officers allegedly were insolvent.
92. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
93. Id.
94. See 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423; 49 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 123 Cal. Rptr. at
239-40; 45 Cal. App. 3d at 565, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 619; see also 77 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 143 Cal. Rptr.
at 393; 70 Cal. 2d at 226-29, 449 P.2d at 163-65, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 227-29.
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courts have refused to find the existence of a duty.95 If Attorney I is
required to be an intended beneficiary of the relationship between Attorney II and the client before a duty will be recognized, it is unlikely
that liability will be imposed in the successor attorney situation.9 6 As
literally worded, however, the first factor does not appear to require
that the third party be an intended beneficiary; the consideration is the
extent to which Attorney I was intended 9to
be affected by the relation7
ship between Attorney II and the client.
Certainly, Attorney II could not avoid affecting Attorney I by his
conduct. 98 In deciding upon a course of action designed to extricate the
client from the predicament created by Attorney I's negligence, Attorney II would undoubtedly be cognizant that his actions could impact
upon Attorney I's potential liability to the client.9 9 The effect of Attorney II's conduct upon Attorney I might, in some respects, be only incidental. However, when considering the fact that Attorney II is suing
Attorney I on behalf of the client for legal malpractice, the intentional
aspect of Attorney II's actions becomes obvious. By filing a malpractice suit against Attorney I on behalf of the client, Attorney II intended
to directly affect Attorney I's professional reputation and financial liability, thus satisfying the first balancing factor.
Regarding the second Biakanja factor, the foreseeability of harm, Attorney I was clearly a foreseeable plaintiff that could potentially be injured by the conduct of Attorney II.°° Foreseeability has been
recognized by courts and commentators alike as the primary factor in
establishing the existence of a legal duty of care.' 0 ' When the class of
persons likely to suffer damage is reasonably foreseeable, as in the successor attorney situation where the harm to Attorney I is a direct consequence of the negligent conduct of Attorney II, a duty of care is
justifiably imposed.' 2
The existence of Attorney II's duty to Attorney I as a foreseeable
third party conforms to the Palsgraf'°3 principle that "[t]he risk reason95. See, e.g., 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423; 45 Cal. App. 3d at 565, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 619.
96. See 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
97. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
98. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 359-60, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34 (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting).
99. See id.
100. Id;see 133 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
101. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968)
stating: "'foreseeability of risk [is] of. . .primary importance in establishing the element of
duty.'" See also Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468, 471 (1975).
102. See 18 Cal. 3d at 353, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
103. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
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ably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."' 1 4 Duty is measured by the scope of the risk which the negligent conduct foreseeably
entails.10 5 As a general principle, a duty of care is owed to all persons

to all risks
foreseeably endangered by one's conduct, with respect
0 6
which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.1
If Attorney II increases the client's losses by performing his duties to

the client negligently, the potential liability of Attorney I is increased.' 0 7 Under traditional tort analysis, a negligent tortfeasor is re-

sponsible for all normal consequences that are the proximate cause of
his negligence.' 0

When the tortious conduct of two or more persons is

a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, 0 9 each tortfeasor is
subject to liability for the entire harm."10 In the successor attorney situation, when the subsequent independent act of Attorney II increases

the harm suffered by the client, Attorney I may be held liable for the
entire amount of the client's damages.' To compel this unjust result
offends the concept of fairness and equity that our judicial system
strives to promote. Judicial action should instead further the public

policy of holding every person responsible for the consequences of their
negligent conduct." 2
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d 334, 342,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
107. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 359-60, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34; see also Commercial Standard
Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 947-48, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393, 401-02 (1979) (Cologne, Acting P.J., dissenting); 20 Cal. 3d at 586-87, 578 P.2d at 904-05, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187-88.
108. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 586, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187; 4 B.
Witkin, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts, §624 at 2906-07 (8th ed. 1974); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §432(2), at 439.
109. See 92 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (contending that Attorney I and Attorney II are independent wrongdoers responsible only for their own damage; the conduct of Attorney I's successor is an independent intervening cause); see also Zavos, Comparative Fault andthe
Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and,4mplfcation of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 775, 785 (1980-81).
[A]n obvious requisite for holding each of two or more such defendants liable for the
entire injury is that the injury be indivisible--that is, the harm cannot be apportioned by
reference to the causative contribution of the defendants. If the injury could be apportioned among two or more defendants based upon their causal contribution, then to hold
them each liable for the entire injury would amount to holding both liable for more
damage than was proximately caused by each.
Id; see also Adler, Allocation of Responsibility after American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REa. 1, 16-19 (1978-79); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§46-47, at 291-99
(4th ed. 1971); 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS §10.1 at 692-709 (1956); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §879, at 324.
110. See 20 Cal. 3d at 586, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (adoption of comparative
negligence does not warrant abolition of joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors); see
also PROSSER, supra note 109, §§46-47, at 291-99; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 109, §10.1, at 692709; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §879, at 324.
111. See generallysupra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
112. See California Civil Code section 1714, providing in relevant part:
(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned by want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or
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The third and fourth of the Biakanja factors," 3 concerned with proximate cause, are satisfied by the directness of the connection between
Attorney II's conduct and the extent of Attorney I's liability. In the
absence of Attorney II's negligence, the liability incurred by Attorney I
would be only that of his own creation-a liability that he justly should
bear. The negligent conduct for which Attorney I seeks recovery occurred in connection with the same transaction in which Attorney I
earlier was involved as counsel for the client. Attorney I's claim is that
Attorney II, in fulfilling his professional obligation to the client, failed
to exercise the ordinary skill and judgment required of an attorney
under similar circumstances. The failure of Attorney II to adhere to
this standard of care not only resulted in a breach of the primary duty
owed the client, but also constituted a breach of the duty owed Attorney I as a foreseeable plaintiff.
A legal duty of care owed by Attorney II to Attorney I should not be
precluded merely upon the basis that Attorney I, whom the client is
suing for malpractice, is an adversary of the client. 114 Attorney II owes
both Attorney I, as a foreseeable plaintiff, and his client the same duty
of care:" 15 to exercise the prudence and diligence lawyers of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise. 1 6 Two important
distinctions must be made, however. First, although Attorney II owes
his client and Attorney I the same legal duty of care, the conduct to
which Attorney II must conform to avoid being negligent in the performance of his responsibilities to each varies. This dissimilarity in the
standard that must be used to evaluate whether Attorney II exercised
reasonable care toward Attorney I on the one hand, and to the client on
the other, results from the nature of the relationship between the parties. The distinguishing factor is the existence of an attorney-chent relationship between Attorney II and the client, and the absence of this
relationship between Attorney II and Attorney I.
The existence of the attorney-client relationship has been the determining factor persuading the courts, as in Goodman and Held,
to dismiss a third party's claim against an attorney for negligence." 7 The
courts have reasoned that requiring an attorney to owe a duty of care to
person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the
injury upon himself. ...

113. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
114. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 357-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34; cf. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at
19. Uut see Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 245 (1979); Metzger v. Silverman, 62 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 30, 37, 133 Cal. Rptr. 355, 360
(1976); 77 Cal. App. 3d at 66-67, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
115. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 360-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (Jefferson, (Bernard) J., dissenting).
116. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865-66 (1961),
117. See 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381; see also 94 Cal. App. 3d at
352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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a third party who is an actual or potential adversary of the client will
necessarily impinge upon the obligation of undivided loyalty and vigorous representation that an attorney owes his client. 1 8 The attorney,
presented with the possibility of a negligence claim by his client's adversary, would find the choices he must make in the client's best interest influenced by "self protective reservations."1"9 These reservations,
state the courts, would prevent the attorney from devoting his fullest
energies to the client. 20
The fact that an attorney owes a duty to his client's adversary should
not cause self protective reservations to be injected into the attorneyclient relationship, nor should it prevent the attorney from giving the
client his undivided loyalty.' 2' In fact, here is where the second distinction in the analysis of Attorney II's duty to his client and to Attorney I emerges. An attorney owes the highest duty of fidelity to his
client by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, 21 and when faced
with conflicting duties, the responsibility of an attorney to his client is
always of primary importance.'23 Even though the duty owed by an
attorney to his client and to a foreseeable third party is the same, this
duty, when it is to be exercised simultaneously by an attorney on behalf
of his client and a nonclient, necessarily is subject to a hierarchy of
interests.
An attorney must prefer the interests of his client over the interests of
a mere foreseeable third party, particularly when that third party is an
adversary of the client. 24 A primary reason for this preference is the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his client. 25 A fiduciary relationship is not found between Attorney I and
Attorney II. The preference that an attorney must give his client's interests is dictated not only by case law, 26 but also by the California
Rules of Professional Conduct' 27 and the American Bar Association
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 128 As evidenced by all
three sources, a lawyer's fiduciary duty to his client is of the highest
118. See Held, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424; see also 94 Cal. App. 3d at 353,
156 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30; 133 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
119. 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
120. See supra note 123.
121. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 360-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
122. See Schullman v. State Bar, 16 Cal. 3d 631, 636, 547 P.2d 447, 449, 128 Cal. Rptr. 671,
673 (1976);see also Greenbaum v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 893, 903, 544 P.2d 921, 927, 126 Cal. Rptr.
785, 791 (1976).
123. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1979).
124. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 5-7 (1979).

125. Id., n.l & n.3; cf.Note, supra note 3, at 140-41.
126. See 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424;seealso 94 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 330. Cf.18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
127. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102 (1979).
128. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 5-7 (1979).
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order. 129 An attorney should exercise his professional judgment within
of his client and free of
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit
130
compromising influences and loyalties.
Although an attorney has the duty to represent his client with zeal,
this duty does not militate against the attorney's concurrent obligation
to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and
Situations in which an atto avoid the infliction of needless harm.'
torney is presented with conflicting duties are not new to our legal system.'3 2 Members of the legal profession are often faced with legitimate
but competing interests. 133 3 As was stated by the California Supreme
Court in.Kirsch v. Duryea:11
In addition to competing strategies, an attorney is often confronted
with clashing obligations by our system of justice. An attorney has
an obligation not only to protect his client's interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice.'3
In Kirsch, the court held that when an apparent conflict exists between an attorney's duty to his client and the attorney's public obligation, the attorney will not be held liable in damages for choosing to
honor the public obligation unless the choice is shown to be so manifestly erroneous that no prudent attorney would have made it. 136 The
defendant-attorney's decision to delay seeking a nonconsensual withdrawal from the plaintiff's medical malpractice case, which he believed
lacked merit, was made in order to minimize the adverse inference a
withdrawal would create as to the merits of the case. 137 Because the
attorney's decision in Kirsch was not "manifestly erroneous," the attorney was absolved of all liability for the choice he made between competing duties, a choice made against the best interests of the client.138
The rationale and test promulgated by the Kirsch decision is equally
applicable when considering whether an attorney has breached a duty
owed to a third party adversary of his client. In this situation, to prove
that Attorney II acted negligently, Attorney I must show that Attorney
129. Id., EC 5-1 n.1.
130. Id., EC 5-1.
131. Id., EC 7-10.
132. See Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 309, 578 P.2d 935, 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222
(1978); see also In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 647, 646 P.2d 179, 185, 183 Cal. Rptr.
508, 514 (1982).
133. See 21 Cal. 3d at 309, 578 P.2d at 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 222; 31 Cal. 3d at 647, 646 P.2d at
185; 183 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
134. 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978).
135. Id. at 309, 578 P.2d at 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 311, 578 P.2d at 940, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
138. Id. at 309, 578 P.2d at 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
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II's decision to act in the best interests of his client, rather than to pursue a course best designed to protect the interests of Attorney I, was
manifestly erroneous. If Attorney II's decision was not manifestly erroneous, he would not have breached the duty owed Attorney I. Such an
analysis necessarily entails a balancing process.
In balancing the conflicting interests, the Kirsch court was sensitive
to the unfairness that would result if an attorney were required to pay
damages merely upon a showing of a mistake in choice.1 39 To hold an
attorney responsible in damages whenever in retrospect, it appears that
he mistakenly sacrificed his client's interests in favor of his public obligations would place what the court considered an "impossible burden
on the practice of law."' 140 Moreover, stated the court, awarding damages against an attorney would violate sound public policy. An attorney, faced with the question of whether vigorous advocacy in favor of a
client must be curtailed in light of an obligation to the public, would
41
decide in favor of the client at the expense of our system of justice.'
In the successor attorney situation, the interests of the client must be
weighed against the interests of the third party attorney. Strong policy
considerations support finding a duty owed to each, although as previously explained, Attorney II's duty to his client is of paramount importance.' 42 Even so, an attorney should be required to exercise his
position of trust responsibly so as not to adversely43 affect persons whose
rights and interests are certain and foreseeable. 1
The Biakanja court enumerated as the fifth balancing factor the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct.144 Attorney II's negligent behavior is not without moral blame, although negligent conduct
is not as blameworthy as other types of behavior society considers reprehensible. Nevertheless, if California courts are to enforce a public
policy requiring each individual to be held responsible for the consequences of his own conduct, attorneys who fail to exercise due care
toward foreseeable third parties should be held accountable for the
harm that results. The fact that Attorney I is also blameworthy in the
successor attorney situation is irrelevant. The crucial fact is that injury,
in the form of increased liability, was inflicted upon Attorney I by Attorney II's negligent behavior. For that infliction of harm, Attorney II
should be held liable.
Finally, Biakanja urged consideration of the policy of preventing fu139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
See 70 Cal. 2d at 229, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229 (1969).
49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
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ture harm.145 An attorney, acting with knowledge that he may be held
liable to third parties whom his conduct unreasonably and foreseeably
endangers, will have a greater incentive to conform his behavior to a
standard of reasonable care.14 6 As a result, attorney misconduct will be
deterred, preventing future harm to third parties and to the attorneyclient relationship.
If a duty were imposed upon Attorney II on behalf of Attorney I,
Attorney II would have greater incentive to execute his responsibilities
to the client in a non-negligent manner. 47 Because of the nature of the
balancing process required to find the breach of a duty owed by Attorney II to Attorney I, for Attorney II to be held liable to Attorney I, the
breach of Attorney II's duty to the client must first be proved. By failing to exercise due care in his dealings with the client, Attorney II increases the client's losses from the transaction initially mishandled by
Attorney I, while at the same time exposing Attorney I to additional
liability in the negligence suit by the client. If Attorney II were cognizant of the fact that in breaching his duty to the client, he could not
only be sued for professional negligence by that client, but also for negligence by Attorney I, Attorney II would have a potent incentive to
avoid all liability.
In conclusion, the balancing of the Biakanja factors dictates that an
attorney be allowed to cross-claim against his successor attorney for
negligence, even when Attorney I is not an intended beneficiary of the
attorney-client relationship. By allowing the cross-claim for negligence, important public policies would be served without sacrificing the
sanctity of the relationship between Attorney II and the client. The
imposition of a duty upon a successor attorney to his client's previous
attorney would not diminish the effectiveness nor impair the loyalty of
Attorney II. On the contrary, because of the additional risk of liability
imposed upon Attorney II for the breach of duty owed Attorney I, nonnegligent conduct would be encouraged. Furthermore, not only should
Attorney I be permitted to cross-claim against Attorney II for professional negligence, but a claim for comparative indemnity should lie as
well.
CROSS-CLAIM FOR COMPARATIVE INDEMNITY

In addition to Attorney I's claim against Attorney II for professional
negligence, a second theory of recovery is available to Attorney I. The
145. Id.
146. See Note, supra note 3, at 127.
147. See Commercial StandardTitle Co., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 949, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
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theory of comparative indemnity permits a concurrent tortfeasor t48 to
obtain indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative
fault basis. 4 9 Because many courts do not require the plaintiff to show
the existence of a duty owed him by the defendant before a cause of
action for comparative indemnity may be stated, this theory of recovery
offers third party attorneys an expanded opportunity to recover for the
negligent conduct of a successor attorney. 50
A.

HistoricalDevelopment of the Doctrine
Prior to Li v. Yellow Cab,'

California followed the harsh common

law "all or nothing" doctrine of contributory negligence. This doctrine
allowed a negligent tortfeasor to escape liability for injury he proximately caused when the injured person's lack of due care was also a
cause of the injury.' 5 2 In Li, the California Supreme Court adopted the

theory of comparative negligence, which permits an injured party's recovery to be proportionately diminished, rather than completely elimi53
nated, when he is partially responsible for his own injury.
Three years after Li, the court in American Motorcycle was called
upon, in light of Li, to reevaluate the common law doctrine of equitable indemnity. Under this common law doctrine, "passive" or "secondarily" negligent tortfeasors were permitted to shift all liability to a
more culpable or "active" tortfeasor 54 The court inAmerican Motorcycle found that the doctrine of equitable indemnity fell short of the

goal in Li of "a system under which liability for damage will be borne
by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respec148. The distinction between concurrent and successive tortfeasors has been blurred in the
case law. See generally PROSSER, supra note 109, §§47-52, at 291-323. Although the court in
American Motorcycle applied the doctrine of partial indemnity to joint or concurrent tortfeasors,
the rule is equally applicable to successive tortfeasors in the successor attorney situation. Concurrent tortfeasors have been defined as follows:
Where the independent acts of several persons contribute to the injury, the wrongdoers
are not joint tortfeasors, and are more properly characterized as concurrent tortfeasors or
successive tortfeasors. . . .The wrongful act may actually be simultaneous or concurrent. . . .The acts may, however, be successive in point of time, one occurring before the
other.
4 B. Witkin, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 34, at 2332-33 (8th ed. 1974) (emphasis ad-

ded); see City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 877, 171 Cal. Rptr.
764, 768 (1981) ("Where the transaction rests upon related facts, either concurrent or successive,
joint or several, which legally create a detriment compensable against multiple actors, the right of
indemnity should follow AMA guidelines, unless a contract or statute otherwise provide."); see
also Zavos, supra note 94, at 783-87.
149. 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
150. See 20 Cal. 3d at 594-95 n.4, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
151. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
152. Id. at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
153. Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
154. 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185; see Adler, supra note 109, at 4-6.
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tive fault."' 55 As a result, the common law doctrine was modified to
permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain comparative indemnity from
other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.' 56
The court expressly determined that the holding of American Motorcycle was consistent with the California contribution statute, 5 7 since
the purpose of the legislation was to lessen the harshness and inequity

of the then prevailing common law rule of no contribution.'58 Nothing
could be found to suggest an intention to preempt the field or to fore-

close further judicial developments promoting the purposes of the statute. 1 59 The court also noted that under the California Code of Civil

Procedure, a defendant is authorized to cross-complain against any
person from whom the defendant claims he is entitled to indemnity,

even though not named in the original complaint. 60 Consequently, a
defendant generally may file a cross-complaint against a concurrent
6
tortfeasor for partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis.'1
B.

GeneralApplication
In adopting the rule of comparative negligence, the court in Li re-

served two related issues for future resolution: the role of willful misconduct under comparative negligence principles, and contribution or
indemnity among joint tortfeasors.' 62 The issue of willful misconduct
first was addressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Sorensen v.
155. 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864; see 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d
at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
156. 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
157. Id. at 583-84, 601-04, 578 P.2d at 902, 912-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185, 195-99; see Fleming,
Report to the Joint Committee ofthe CaliforniaLegislature on Tort Liabilityon the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1464, 1481
(1979). The Code of Civil Procedure sections 875-876 directs that contribution be allocated "pro
rata" (i.e., according to the number of defendants) and not in accordance with their individual
shares of fault.
158. 20 Cal. 3d at 601, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195-99.
159. Id.
160. California Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10 provides in relevant part:
A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted. . .may file a cross-complaint
setting forth. . .(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable
thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action
asserted in his cross-complaint (I) arises out of the same transaction (or) occurrence. . .as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right or interest in
the. . .controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.
The propriety of filing a cross-complaint against a previously unnamed party is reiterated in California Code of Civil Procedure section 428.20 which provides in full:
When a person files a cross-complaint as authorized by Section 428. 10, he may join any
person as a cross-complainant or cross-defendant, whether or not such person is already
a party to the action, if, had the cross-complaint been filed as an independent action, the
joinder of that party would have been permitted by the statutes governing joinder of
parties.
161. 20 Cal. 3d at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
162. 13 Cal. 3d at 823-26, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
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Allred.6 3 In Sorensen, the court held that the doctrine of comparative
negligence applies in cases involving willful and wanton misconduct,
just as the doctrine applies in cases involving other varieties of tortious
injury."6 The court recognized a trend toward adoption of an apportionment of the fault doctrine, irrespective of the nature of the alleged
negligent conduct or other basis for liability.'6 5 In support of this
trend, the court referred to the California Supreme Court decision of
Dalv v. GeneralMotors Corp., 6 6 in which comparative fault principles
were applied to apportion responsibility between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff in a product liability action.'6 7 Since
the Daly decision, the California Supreme Court has held that the basic
equitable considerations that led to the comparative indemnity rule
among multiple negligent tortfeasors applies equally in circumstances
68
involving a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant.
The issue of contribution or indemnity among joint tortfeasors was
determined by the court in American Motorcycle.169 Despite the willingness of California courts to embrace the comparative indemnity
doctrine of American Motorcycle to apportion liability between a multiple tortfeasor who is negligent and a tortfeasor who (1) is guilty of willful misconduct 7 ° or (2) is strictly liable,' 7 ' comparative indemnity has
been denied deserving defendants under certain circumstances. One
factual situation in which the courts have generally refused to permit a
cross-claim for comparative indemnity involves the successor attorney. 172 The cases that denied a defendant attorney's cross-claim
against a successor attorney for comparative indemnity failed to adequately consider statutory authority as well as the underlying policies
of the comparative indemnity doctrine. For this reason, those cases
should be carefully scrutinized and their value as binding precedent
questioned. Principles of fairness and equity in judicial decision-making require that Attorney I be allowed to cross-claim against Attorney
II for the amount of injury proximately caused by the successor attorney's negligent conduct.
163. 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980).
164. Accord Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State of California, 115 Cal. App. 3d 116,
118, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (1981); see 112 Cal. App. 3d at 726, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
165. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
166. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
167. See id. at 742-43, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390; see also Levy & Ursin, Tort Law
in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 497, 530-33 (1979).
168. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 325, 579 P.2d 441, 442, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 551 (1978); see also Note, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest Kart: The Culmination ofLi v.
Yellow Cab Co., 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 571 (1979).

169.
170.
171.
172.

20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-91.
See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for the successor attorney situation defined.
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Comparative Indemnity and the Successor Attorney

Attorney I's cross-complaint for comparative indemnity is supported
by both statutory and case authority.17 3 A review of this authority
reveals two primary arguments Attorney I should advance to persuade
a court to hear his claim. First, Attorney I should argue that a crossclaim for comparative indemnity is to be allowed as a matter of
right.'1 4 Second, the claim is compelled by public policies underlying
17 5
the doctrine of comparative fault.
1. Comparative Indemnity as a Matter of Right

After first concluding that "a concurrent tortfeasor enjoys a common
law right to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors
on a comparative fault basis,"'7 6 the court in American Motorcycle
went on to hold that a defendant is authorized to seek indemnification
from a previously unnamed party through a cross-complaint under
Section 428.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.'
In discussing the

right of a defendant to cross-complain against a potential cotortfeasor
who was not joined by the plaintiff, the court found explicit statutory
authority for the proposition that a defendant's cross-complaint must

78
be allowed as a matter of right.
The defendant in American Motorcycle argued that in permitting the
joinder of alleged cotortfeasors whom the plaintiff had not joined, issues would tend to be complicated and the plaintiff would be deprived
of the right to control the size and scope of the litigation. 79 The court
observed, however, that the trial court is authorized to bifurcate the

proceeding by ordering a separate trial of any cause of action. Section
1048(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the trial court to order separate trials "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See generally infra notes 176-285 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 241-85 and accompanying text.
20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
See 20 Cal. 3d at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185, stating:
[U]nder the governing provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, a named defendant
is authorized to file a cross-complaint against any person, whether already a party to the
action or not, from whom the named defendant seeks to obtain total or partial indemnity. Although the trial court retains the authority to postpone the trial of the indemnity
question if it believes such action is appropriate to avoid unduly complicating the plaintiff's suit, the court may not preclude thefiling ofsuch a cross-complaintaltogether.
(Emphasis added). See also 92 Cal. App. 3d at 947, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02 (Cologne, Acting
P.J.,
dissenting); Gehman v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 257, 266, 158 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68
(1979); Simmons, The Effect of Comparative Fault on California Contribution/Indemnification
Rights.- How to Employ andAvoid the New Tortious Quicksand, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 773, 775
(1982); Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence-The New
DoctrineofEquitable Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779, 802 (1978).
179. See 20 Cal. 3d at 606, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
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or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy."18 The court concluded, however, that in the context of the facts
presented by a comparative indemnity claim, "severance may at times
This is true given the fact that
not be an attractive alternative."''
"when the plaintiff is alleged to have been partially at fault for the
injury, each of the third party defendants will have the right to litigate
the question of the plaintiff's proportionate fault for the accident,"' 82
raising the specter of inconsistent findings.
Even though the court in American Motorcycle purported to give the
trial court a small degree of discretion in determining whether to order
a separate trial of the cause of action alleged in the cross-complaint,
this discretion was effectively withdrawn. 8 3 As the opinion stated:
[H]aving already noted that under the comparative negligence
doctrine a plaintiffs recovery should be diminished only by that proportion which the plaintiff's negligence bears to that of all
tortfeasors. . ., we think it only fair that a defendant who may be
jointly and severally liable for all of the plaintiff's damages be permitted to bring other concurrent tortfeasors into the suit. Thus, we
conclude that the interaction of the partial indemnity doctrine with
California's existing cross-complaint procedures works no undue
prejudice to the rights of plaintiffs.'8 4
In conclusion, the court stated:
[U]nder the governing statutory provisions a defendant is generally
authorized to file a cross-complaint against a concurrent tortfeasor
for partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis, even when such
concurrent tortfeasor has not been named a defendant in the original
complaint.'8 5
The "generally authorized" qualification of the rule allowing the
filing of a cross-complaint was explained by the court to preclude a
cross-complaint when statutory law does not permit indemnification,
and when a concurrent tortfeasor has made a good faith settlement.' 8 6
In the case of an attorney who alleges that the negligence of a successor
attorney is a concurrent cause of the plaintiff-client's injury, no substantial reason exists for denying the filing of the cross-complaint.' 87
Therefore, the general authorization identified by the court inAmerican
Motorcycle should be interpreted to remove trial court discretion to
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See 92 Cal. App. 3d at 947-48, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02 (Cologne, Acting P.J., dissenting).
20 Cal. 3d at 606, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.

185. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200 (emphasis added).
186. 20 Cal. 3d at 607 n.9, 578 P.2d at 917-18, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
187. See 92 Cal. App. 3d at 947-48, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02 (Cologne, Acting P.J., dissenting).
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deny Attorney I's cross-complaint for comparative indemnity. The
cross-complaint must be allowed as a matter of right.'
2. Public Policy Support
American Motorcycle indicated that the doctrine of comparative indemnity applies in "appropriate cases" to permit apportionment of liability among multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis." 9 As
previously noted, the court identified specific situations in which indemnity is inappropriate. 90 A reasonable conclusion to infer from this
approach in which exceptions to the comparative indemnity doctrine
were listed, is that the court did not intend to preclude indemnity in the
case of a successor attorney. The absence of the successor attorney
situation from the exceptions to the general rule permitting comparative indemnity, however, should not be viewed as decisive. More important than this absence are the public policy arguments supporting
the availability of indemnity in cases involving a successor attorney's
negligence.
a.

Court Decisions

The public policies that support Attorney I's indemnity claim may
best be examined by reviewing the various court decisions that have
addressed the issue. The seminal case considering the issue of whether
comparative indemnity is available in the successor attorney situation
was Held v. Arant,' 9 ' discussed earlier in this comment in connection
with the cross-claim for negligence.' 92 Decided prior to American Motorcycle, Held did not address the issue of whether Attorney I should
have a claim for comparative indemnity based upon comparative fault
principles. The court, however, did discuss the applicability of equitable indemnity as it had been adopted by the courts in medical malpractice cases. 193 Reasons of policy peculiar to the tripartite relationship of
attorney-client-adversary were found by the court in Held to override
the principle of equitable indemnity, resulting in the dismissal of Attorney I's cross-complaint. 94 The public policy cited by the court as compelling was the policy of protecting the interests of the client. If
Attorney II could be required to indemnify Attorney I, the court hypothesized that this could encroach upon the duty of undivided loyalty
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
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See id; see also supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422.
See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
67 Cal. App. 3d at 751-52, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
Id. at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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Attorney II owed his client. 195 The court stated:
[Attorney II's] ability to choose between courses of conduct best
designed to protect the interests of [his] client cannot be inhibited by
the proposition that if [he] chooses the course of resistance of the
claim [he] will be immune from liability to the one adversary absent
malicious prosecution. . ., while if [he] chooses the course of prosecuting the client's claim for malpractice against a prior 96
attorney [he]
may be subject to a claim to indemnify that attorney.'
The critical factor in the reasoning of the court was the possibility
that the attorney might prefer his own interests over the interests of the
client when presented with a decision between competing courses of
conduct. 197 The Held decision was notably lacking in discussion of the
policies that would be served by permitting Attorney I's claim for indemnity. 198 Since Held preceded American Motorcycle, and since the
court noted that the effect of comparative negligence principles was not
raised, the issue being treated as waived, the persuasiveness and precedential value of Held should have been questioned by subsequent
courts dealing with the identical issue.' 99
The next case 200 to confront the issue of whether to permit a successor attorney to be sued by his predecessor attorney for indemnity was
Gibson.2"' In Gibson, the court adopted and expanded upon the pronouncement of public policy in Held, based upon equitable indemnity
as applied in medical malpractice cases. Significantly, however, the
Gibson court discussed American Motorcycle, facing squarely the effect
of comparative indemnity upon the successor attorney situation.20 2
Gibson involved an action by a creditor against the bank and law
firm that originally had advised the creditor regarding a transaction
requiring the client to guarantee a note. The note was to be payable to
a bank, and collateralized with certain security interests of the credi195. See id.

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
199. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 357-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34 (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting).
200. Prior to Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, the court in Commercial Standard Title Co., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393, hearingdenied, (1979), rendered a split

decision upholding the dismissal of the defendant's cross-complaint for partial equitable indemnity. In CommercialStandard,the plaintiff sued two title insurance companies for negligently and
fraudulently issuing a defective lot book guarantee upon which plaintiff relied in entering into a
real estate transaction. The defendant title insurance companies cross-complained against the
plaintiff attorney, alleging that it was the attorney's negligence in advising the plaintiff to rely
upon the guarantee that caused the plaintiffs injury. This case may be distinguished from the
successor attorney situation in two respects: (1) the claim for indemnity was made by a nonattorney, and (2) the issue presented was whether the plaintifispriorattorney can be subjected to
a cross-complaint.
201. 94 Cal. App. 3d 347, 156 Cal. Rptr. 326.

202. See id. at 351-56, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 328-31.
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tor's wholly owned subsidiary. The subsidiary defaulted, and a bankruptcy proceeding followed.2" 3 On the bank's demand, the creditor
paid the note, and then retained Attorney II to extricate him from the
loss he had suffered. 2" Attorney II filed an action on behalf of the
creditor against the bank and Attorney I, alleging that both were negligent in failing to advise the creditor of the risk that the security interests would not be enforceable. Thereafter, the bank and Attorney I
severally filed cross-complaints alleging that Attorney II was negligent
in representing the creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings and that this
negligence contributed to the loss the creditor suffered. 20 5
The Gibson court viewed the law enunciated in Goodman and Held
as binding precedent. As previously discussed,20 6 Goodman is distinguishable on its facts from the successor attorney situation. Furthermore, both Goodman and Held were decided prior to the California
Supreme Court decision of American Motorcycle.20 7 Clearly, neither
holding should have been considered persuasive to any degree in Gibson .208 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the successor attorney
could not be held liable, stating:
What was said in Held v. Arant is quite as applicable to indemnification under the comparative negligence standards. Since American
Motorcycle has greatly expanded the opportunities for defendants in
negligence cases to seek indemnification from parties whom the
plaintiff did not choose to sue, the hazard to the attorney-client relationship could now be vastly greater than it was under the substantive law previously in effect.20 9
The court in Gibson, as in Held, emphasized that the successor attorney was called upon to exercise his professional judgment in choosing
between alternative remedies.2" 0 The choice presented to Attorney II
in Gibson was whether to settle with other creditors and sue the former
attorneys for the loss, or to litigate with the creditors. 21 Of primary
concern to the court was the effect that a possible conflict of interest
would have upon the relationship between Attorney II and the client
when the client's alternatives are under consideration. Attorney II
should not be required to face a potential conflict between the course
that is in his client's best interest and the course that would minimize
203. Id. at 349-50, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 350, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
206. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
207. Goodman was decided in 1976, Held in 1977 and American Motorcycle in 1978.
208. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 357-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34 (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting).
209. Id. at 355, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
210. Id. at 355-56, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
211. Id.
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his exposure to the cross-complaint of Attorney

I.212

While concerned about the impact of a cross-claim for indemnity
upon the attorney-client relationship, the Gibson court refused to consider as controlling what it found to be the "most conspicuous conse-

quence of a cross-complaint against the plaintiffs lawyer": precluding
that lawyer from trying the case on behalf of the plaintiff.2" 3 As au-

thority for this position, the Gibson court cited the decision of Comden
v. Superior Court,2 14 in which the California Supreme Court held that

both trial counsel and his law firm must withdraw from litigating a case
whenever trial counsel determines that he or she ought to testify, or is
likely to testify on behalf of the client.215 Even though the court in
Gibson viewed depriving a party of the lawyer of his choice as a serious
matter, the 'Comden decision was interpreted as giving secondary im-

portance to a party's need to be represented by the law firm deemed
best qualified for the task.21 6 Therefore, the critical consideration for

denying Attorney I's cross-complaint in Gibson was, as in Held, the
potential detrimental effect upon the attorney-client relationship.
Immediately after Gibson, the case of Rowell v. Transpacific Life Ins.
C0.217 was decided. In Rowell, the defendant insurance company was

charged with misconduct in delaying payment on a disability insurance
policy. 218 The insurance company sought to cross-complain against the
plaintiff's present attorneys, alleging that the dilatory conduct of the

attorneys and their failure to present proper supporting documentation
caused the delay of payment.21 9 Once again, Attorney I was denied
recovery. The court in Rowell, with little discussion, followed Held and
Gibson, stating:
The potential of conflict between the client's best interest and the
course which the lawyer must take to minimize his own exposure to a
cross-complaint from the adversary is untenable in view of the law212.
424.
213.
214.
215.
216.
SIONAL

Id. at 356, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32; see also 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752-53, 134 Cal. Rptr. at

94 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
Id. at 13, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Cf. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESCONDUCT Rule 211(5) (1979), stating:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a member of
the State Bar learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a
witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation until it is
apparentthat his testimony is or may be prejudicialto his client.
(Emphasis added). Attorney II would most likely be called as an adverse witness under section
776 of the California Evidence Code; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 &

5-10 (1979).
217. 94 Cal. App. 3d 818, 156 Cal. Rptr. 696, hearing denied (1979).
218. Rowell, as CommercialStandard,may be distinguished from the successor attorney situation in that the claim for indemnity was made by a non-attorney.
219. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
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yer's duty of undivided loyalty to his client.2 2 °
Soon after the Rowell decision, the case of Parker v. Morton22 1 was
litigated. In writing the majority opinion for the court, Presiding Justice Kaufman asserted at the outset his disagreement with the public
policy ground announced in Held.22 2 The opinion expressed the view
that the rights and liabilities ofjoint-tortfeasors as between themselves
had been thoroughly settled, and that Held and its progeny were an
unfortunate departure from precedent. 223 The Parker court found that
the rule of comparative indemnity was derived from several well-recognized legal principles, all of which foster the important public policy of
encouraging persons to act with reasonable care. As a consequence, the
court held that the general rule allowing indemnity should not be departed from in the absence of compelling reasons.
No compelling reasons were present under the facts of Parker to justify a departure. 224 The plaintiff-wife initially had begun the action as
a suit for legal malpractice against her former attorney, Parker (Attorney I), who had represented her in a dissolution proceeding. 225 In that
suit, the plaintiff alleged that Parker failed to litigate her community
property interest in the vested military pension of her husband. Parker
cross-complained for total or partial indemnity against Morton (Attorney II), the attorney whom the plaintiff subsequently retained to remedy the problem of the unlitigated military pension. In the crosscomplaint, Parker alleged that Morton had also failed to pursue the
client's community property claim against the client's former husband,
thereby causing or exacerbating the damages the plaintiff sought in her
complaint against Parker.22 6
In allowing the claim for indemnity, the Parker court distinguished
the situation before it from that in Held and Gibson. The court reasoned that the negligence charged by the cross-complaint was not that
Attorney II was negligent in choosing between two alternative remedies, but that Attorney II exacerbated the client's damages by failing to
pursue one of the remedies. 227 Attorney II was required to pursue the
remedy of litigating the client's community property interest in the
vested military pension plan of the client's husband in all events, both
to protect the client's interests and to fulfill the client's obligation to
220.
221.
222.
223.
614.
224.
225.
226.
227.
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Id. at 821, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
117 Cal. App. 3d 751, 173 Cal. Rptr. 197.
See id. at 755, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
Id. at 755-56, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200; see also 133 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 183 Cal. Rptr. at
117 CaL App. 3d at 756, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
Id. at 754, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 198.

Id.
Id. at 760, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 202.

1983 / Successor Attorney

mitigate the damages resulting from Attorney I's negligence. 221
The institution of a suit against the plaintiffs former spouse was necessary as a matter of law.229 No choice of remedies or exercise of professional judgment was required of Attorney II. For these reasons, the
court concluded that Attorney I's cross-claim for indemnity against Attorney II was not precluded by a conflict with Attorney II's duty of
undivided loyalty to the client.2 3 ° On the contrary, to hold Attorney II
liable for his negligence would encourage attorneys in similar positions
to more fully protect the interests of their clients. 231 Thus, allowing
Attorney I's cross-claim was appropriate under the circumstances.
The most recent case to confront the issue of permitting comparative
indemnity in the successor attorney situation is that of Goldfisher v. Su'perior Court.23 2 In Goldfisher, Attorney I initially represented the clients in several actions, one of which was defending against a
preliminary injunction. 233 The clients, believing that Attorney I negligently created the situation that engendered the lawsuit, and that the
lawsuit was improperly managed, substituted Attorney 11.23' Thereafter, Attorney I, through an assignee, sued the clients for fees, and the
clients employed Attorney II to represent them. Attorney II answered,
and filed a cross-complaint on the clients' behalf against Attorney I for
negligence. Attorney I then appeared in the fee action and cross-complained against Attorney II, alleging that Attorney II could have successfully defended the request for a preliminary injunction in the
primary action, had he been properly prepared.2 35 In addition, Attorney I charged that by reason of a lack of defense to the issuance of the
preliminary injunction and in general, to the management of the primary action, the damages allegedly caused by Attorney I were generated, or at least exacerbated, by the professional negligence of Attorney
11.236

After reviewing the line of successor attorney cases beginning with
Held and ending most recently with Parker, the Goldfisher court concluded that Attorney II, when succeeding to the unfinished work of
Attorney I, could reasonably foresee that if the client claimed malfea228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id. at 761, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
Id. at 767, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07.
Id;see 92 Cal. App. 3d at 949, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Cologne, Acting P.J., dissenting).
133 Cal. App. 3d 12, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1982).
Id. at 14, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sance on the part of Attorney I, indemnity would be sought.2 3 7 Nevertheless, the court, citing Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in Goodman,
stated: "We think that Goodman and Norton do suggest limitations on
extension of the rule of foreseeability. 2 38 The court then reasoned that
encouraging claims of indemnification when two lawyers successively
represent the same client does not benefit the client. The court
explained:
A multiplicity of actions germinating and emphasizing rights and
principles heretofore unexploited are being continuously filed. The
field of litigation, always sensitive, complex and explosive, grows
geometrically .... The facts which generally germinate the relief
239
sought at bench are pregnant with the seed of exacerbated conflict.
The inevitable consequence of permitting-the indemnity cross-claim,
stated the court, "is a corrosion of the sacred attributes of complete
confidentiality and undivided loyalty which are the heart of the relationship between lawyer and client." As a result, differences between
lawyer and client respecting malpractice should be limited to
themselves.2 40
b. Application of Public Policy Considerations
The courts generally have identified three primary public policies
supporting the holding that an attorney sued by a former client for
malpractice may not cross-complain against the client's successor attorney:2 41 (1) as a consequence of a cross-complaint for indemnity, the
client will be deprived of the attorney of his choice;2 42 (2) undesirable
self-protective reservations will be injected into the attorney's counseling role, thereby diminishing the quality of legal services received by
the client;243 and (3) the threat of a lawsuit by an adversary of the client
will impinge upon the undivided loyalty of the second attorney in advising his client, 2" jeopardizing the policy of encouraging confidence
and preserving inviolate the attorney-client relationship. 45 These policy justifications, however, either have been dismissed by the more
carefully reasoned opinions on the subject, or are greatly outweighed
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 21-22, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
Id. at 22, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
Id., 183 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
Id.
See 117 Cal. App. 3d at 767-69, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08 (Morris, J., dissenting).

242. See, e.g., id. at 767, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 207; 94 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
243. See, e.g., 117 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 207; 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 744,
134 Cal.Rptr. at 381.
244. See, e.g., 117 Cal. App. 3d at 767, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 207; 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 424.
245. See, e.g., 117 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 207; 92 Cal. App. 3d at 944-45, 155
Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
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by the public policy supporting the comparative indemnity claim. As
the following discussion will demonstrate, the interests of the client and
of the judicial system are best served by permitting Attorney I to crossclaim against Attorney II, and not by denying the claim, as several
courts have asserted.
(1) The Client's Choice ofAttorney. If Attorney I's cross-complaint
for indemnity were allowed, Attorney II, as a practical matter, would
be required to withdraw from representing the client.2 46 As a result,
the client would be deprived of his choice of counsel. This possible
consequence is by no means determinative of whether Attorney I's
cross-claim should be dismissed.24 7 In fact, at least one court remains
unconvinced that the filing of a cross-complaint against Attorney II
will, in all cases, necessitate the withdrawal of Attorney II from representing the client in the action.2 48 This same court is also of the opinion that if a problem exists concerning Attorney II's continued
representation of the client, this problem should be brought to light
during the pleading stage of the case, rather than in the midst of
trial.24 9
Even though American Motorcycle approved allocation of responsibility between defendants, the opinion did not discuss whether a crosscomplaint is required to obtain an adjudication of the indemnity claim,
25 0
or whether an affirmative defense requesting allocation is sufficient.
In the defendant's petition in American Motorcycle, the court was requested only to permit the filing of a cross-complaint to join additional
defendants.2 5' Nevertheless, permitting allocation to be predicated
upon the pleading of comparative indemnity as an affirmative defense
is entirely consistent with the holding in that case.2 52 In fact, allocation
has been requested and obtained by both the cross-complaint and affirmative defense methods in California courts, with the practices varying between northern and southern California.2 53
Regardless of whether the court permits or refuses Attorney I's crossclaim for indemnity, Attorney II will still be faced with the potential
246. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
248. See 117 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
249. Id. at 767, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
250. See generally 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
251. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
252. See Adler, supra note 109, at 11.
253. Id.
Analogizing to the affirmative defense which raised the issue of the employer's negligence in Wil v. Jackson, many attorneys in northern California have relied upon the
pleading of comparative contribution as an affirmative defense. On the other hand, the
more common practice in southern California appears to be that this issue is placed in

controversy by a cross-complaint.
Id. at 11.
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ramifications of his negligent conduct. Once the cross-claim is filed, or
Attorney I's defense of comparative negligence is asserted, the client
will be on notice of alleged malfeasance by Attorney II. If the crossclaim by Attorney I is denied, two options are available to the client
who wishes to maximize his chances of recovery for Attorney II's negligence. The client must either join Attorney II as a defendant in his suit
against Attorney I, or wait until the present suit is resolved against Attorney I and then sue Attorney II for malpractice in a separate action.
Neither alternative is a desirable one for the client.
If the client chooses to join Attorney II, he will be faced with potentially the same situation presented by the filing of the cross-claim.
Whereas the client, when joining Attorney II, will be forced to retain
yet a third attorney to conduct the action on his behalf, this consequence is not so certain when Attorney II is made a party defendant by
Attorney I.254 If the client chooses to wait for the outcome of the suit
against Attorney I and then sues Attorney II in a separate action for
malpractice, the client will not only be required to retain another attorney, but he must also be prepared, to bear the cost of another lawsuit
and to face the ever present possibility of an inconsistent result which
would deny him full recovery.255 In terms of both cost and convenience, the most desirable option for the client would be for the court to
permit Attorney I to cross-claim against Attorney II for comparative
indemnity.
(2) Self-protective Reservations. In permitting Attorney I's cross-

claim for comparative indemnity, no new "undesirable self-protective
reservations" will be injected into the attorney's counseling role, as
feared by the courts.256 Those reservations will necessarily exist in the
absence of the cross-claim. As a practical matter, if the problem of
Attorney II's alleged negligence does not appear as the result of a crosscomplaint for comparative indemnity, it most certainly will arise either
in the course of the defendant's discovery with respect to his defenses to
257
the main action, or during trial.
Two of Attorney I's prime defenses at trial must of necessity be that a
substantial part of the damages claimed by the client were not proximately caused by Attorney I's negligence, but rather by the negligence
of Attorney II, and that plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by filing
an action for professional negligence against Attorney II11 s These de254. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
255. See generaly Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1464, 1490

(1979).

256. See supra notes 77-82, 206-12 and accompanying text.
257. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
258. See id.
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fenses should be asserted by Attorney I in order to ensure the allocation
of responsibility for the client's damages in accordance with the doctrine of comparative negligence. As the court stated in American Motorcycle: "[I]t is logically essential that the plaintiffs negligence be
weighed against the combined total of all other causative
259
negligence.
(3) UndividedLoyalty to Client. It has been argued that the threat
of a suit for indemnity by an adversary of the client impinges upon the
undivided loyalty of the second attorney to his client. 260 This argument, however, fails to consider one obvious fact: Attorney II's selfinterest in avoiding a malpractice suit exists whether or not the crossclaim for comparative indemnity is allowed. To permit the cause of
action creates no additional conflict of interest that would influence Attorney II's judgment on behalf of his client. 26' Also, it is just as plausible, if not more so, that the threat of a cross-complaint by Attorney I
would encourage Attorney II to use even greater care in protecting his
client.2 62 This is true because Attorney II can avoid all liability by simply fulfilling his duty to the client. The threat of a cross-claim for indemnity by Attorney I would merely act as an additional deterrent to a
breach of the legal duty Attorney II owes his client. 263 As Justice Jefferson, dissenting in Gibson urged with substantial justification:
[I]t is tenuous and speculative at best to conclude that permitting
cross-complaints by lawyer I against lawyer II in a malpractice action against lawyer I will distort and adversely affect lawyer II's ability to devote his best efforts to serving his client. The Goodman,
Held, and Norton rationale rests on an unexamined and unpersuasive hypothesis, namely, the belief that the possibility of an attorney's
liability to third parties for negligence in advising a client will inhibit
an attorney's best representation of his client even in a situation
where there is4 no conflict between the interest of the client and the
26
third party.
Also unpersuasive is the suggestion that completely meritless crosscomplaints might irresponsibly be filed against the plaintiffs attorney
"motivated by naught but spite and a desire to spread confusion, dissention (sic) in the opponent's camp. ' 265 Ample deterrence is provided
259.
260.
261.
262.

20 Cal. 3d at 590 n.2, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
See supra notes 220, 230-31 and accompanying text.
94 Cal. App. 3d at 360, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (Jefferson (Bernard), J., dissenting).
92 Cal. App. 3d at 949, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 403; 117 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 173 Cal. Rptr. at

206.
263. See 117 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206; see also Note, supra note 3, at 130.
264. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 360, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
265. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 945, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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by the prospect of liability for malicious prosecution,2 66 in which settled law permits the tort victim to recover the costs of defending the

prior action including reasonable attorney's fees, compensation for injury to reputation or impairment of social and business standing 2in67 the
community, and compensation for mental or emotional distress.

One of the public policies served by permitting Attorney I to crossclaim for indemnity is that of judicial economy. As the California
Supreme Court recognized in Shepard & Morgan v. Lee & Daniel,

Inc.,268 overburdened courts gain nothing from rules that discourage
the filing of cross-complaints in favor of independent actions. The

cross action procedure represents a more orderly and expeditious resolution of the controversy. 269 An additional factor favoring the indemnity cross-claim is one identified by Presiding Justice Cologne in his
dissenting opinion in Commercial Standard:
[T]he importance of having all tortfeasors before the court to secure a defendant's right of indemnity overrides the plaintiffs right to
shield his attorney and, incidentally, his own behavior, on the issues
he has raised by the lawsuit. I find the sanctity of their relationship
in this regard no more sacred than the public policy calling for family harmony that was involved in American Motorcycle... where a
a tortfeasor for purposes of inparent was allowed to be joined as
270
demnity in his own child's action.
Perhaps the most significant policy justification supporting Attorney
I's cross-claim is that embodied in the Li and American Motorcycle decisions. In abrogating the harsh "all or nothing" doctrine of contribution, the court in Li relied upon the intent of the California Legislature
as expressed by Civil Code section 1714.271 That code section states
that every person is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or
person.2 72 This rule applies only'to the extent that the person injured
266. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
267. Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 51, 529 P.2d 608, 614, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184, 190 (1974). The California Supreme Court in Bertero recognized that an actionable claim for
the malicious prosecution of a cross-claim filed without probable cause can be stated. As the
result ofBertero, Attorney II can maintain a cause of action for malicious prosecution based upon
Attorney I's cross-claim for comparative indemnity, and may recover if the indemnity action commenced by Attorney I is: (1) pursued to a legal termination in Attorney II's favor; (2) brought
without probable cause; and (3) initiated with malice.
268. 31 Cal. 3d 256, 261, 643 P.2d 968, 970, 182 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353 (1982).
269. See Id.; Teachers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 128 Cal. App. 3d 862, 866, 180 Cal. Rptr. 701, 704
(1982) (A claim for comparative indemnity is independent and can be brought in a separate suit
after the settlement or after satisfaction of judgment in the underlying suit); see also People ex rel.
Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 748, 608 P.2d 673, 676, 163 Cal. Rptr.
585, 588 (1980).
270. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
271. 13 Cal. 3d at 821, 532 P.2d at 1238, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
272. CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.
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has not willfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injury upon
himself. Further, this responsibility may not be escaped simply because another act--either an "innocent" occurrence such as an "act of
God" or3 other negligent conduct-may also have been a cause of the

injury.

The Li court specifically noted that the statutory language of section
1714 has not prevented the active judicial development of the twin concepts of duty of care and proximate cause.2 74 In addition, section 1714
has not hindered the development of rules permitting a finding of liability in the absence of direct evidence establishing a defendant's negligence as the actual cause of the damage.27 5 The Li court concluded
that the Code should be construed liberally in accordance with the historical development of judicial doctrines to "give dynamic expression
to the fundamental precepts which it summarizes. 27 6 These fundamental precepts are: (1) one whose negligence has caused damage to
another should be liable therefor, and (2) one whose negligence has
contributed to his own injury should not be permitted to cast the burden of liability upon another.2 77
Neither of these fundamental precepts is served when a cross-claim
for comparative indemnity is rejected in the successor attorney situation. Denying Attorney I's cross-claim could result, under the rules of
joint and several liability, in Attorney II escaping all responsibility for
damages proximately caused by his negligent conduct.2 78 Attorney I
could be forced to bear not only his share of the client's loss occasioned
by his own negligence, but damages that could be attributed to Attorney II's behavior as well.27 9 Certainly this outcome, resulting in the
unjust enrichment of Attorney II at the expense of Attorney I, is not
consistent with the policy expressed by the Legislature in section
1714.280
Even though Attorney I could assert the comparative negligence of
Attorney II as an affirmative defense, 28 ' Attorney I should be given the
alternative of filing a cross-complaint for indemnity for an additional
reason. As enunciated in American Motorcycle, as between tortfeasors
who contribute to a loss, each shall bear the loss in proportion to
273.
274.
275.
Cal. 2d
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
13 Cal. 3d at 822, 532 P.2d at 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
Id. (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 154 P.2d 1, 5 (1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944)).
13 Cal. 3d at 822, 532 P.2d at 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
See id.
See 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
Id.
See 13 Cal. 3d at 822-23, 532 P.2d at 1239-40, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
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fault.2 82 The court inAmerican Motorcycle emphasized this goal of loss

allocation in requiring a modification of California's traditional all-ornothing common law equitable indemnity doctrine.283 Concurring
with Dean Prosser's observation in a related context, the court stated
that:
[T]here is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits
the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
were. . .unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one
alone.. .while the latter goes scot free.284
Clearly, the rejection of Attorney I's cross-claim flies in the face of this
policy goal.
In summary, persuasive public policies embodied in the doctrines of
comparative negligence and comparative indemnity should not be frustrated or ignored in favor of a policy that protects a negligent attorney
under the guise of preserving the attorney-client relationship. As previously demonstrated, no substantial justification exists for placing the
entire burden of a client's damages on the client's former attorney
when the successor attorney is also blameworthy. Fairness dictates that
the blameworthiness of all actors whose conduct was a proximate cause
of the client's injury be treated consistently.
With the overriding nature of public policies underlying the doctrine
of comparative indemnity made clear, reason and fairness mandate
recognition of the comparative indemnity claim of Attorney I. As
stated by the court in Parker: "Manifestly, the general rule allowing
proportionate indemnity, subserving as it does this fundamental public
policy [of encouraging persons to conduct themselves with reasonable
care] should not be departed from in the absence of compelling reasons." 285 No valid reasons support a departure from the general rule in
the successor attorney situation.
CONCLUSION

This comment has demonstrated that neither precedent nor policy
considerations justify depriving an attorney of a cause of action either
for professional negligence or comparative indemnity against a former
client's present attorney whose negligent conduct allegedly caused or
exacerbated the client's damages. To deny either of these claims would
be to blatantly ignore the principles of equity and fairness which dic282.
283.
284.
285.
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Id., citing PROSSER, supra note 109, §50, at 307.
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tate that tortfeasors should bear responsibility for all consequences of
their wrongs. Negligent attorneys should not be an exception.
An attorney should owe a duty of care to all who foreseeably may be
injured by his negligent conduct in the absence of overriding policy
considerations. Since the balancing of the Biakanja factors in the successor attorney situation weighs heavily in favor of imposing a duty to
Attorney I upon Attorney II, this duty should be recognized. Attorney
I's claim for professional negligence against Attorney II, consequently,
should be allowed.
In addition to a cause of action for professional negligence, Attorney
I should have available to him a claim for comparative indemnity.
The important loss allocation principles of comparative negligence underlying the indemnity doctrine dictate that Attorney I's cross complaint for comparative indemnity should be denied only in compelling
circumstances. No compelling circumstances are present in the successor attorney situation. Allegations that a cross-complaint for either
comparative indemnity or professional negligence would impinge upon
the undivided loyalty Attorney II owes the client are simply unfounded. A close analysis of the situation reveals that the interests of
the client will best be served by sustaining the cross-complaints. Since
the primary reason courts have refused to permit a cross-claim on
either theory has been to preserve the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship, insufficient justification exists for the courts to deny Attorney I a remedy.
To deprive an attorney of a remedy for an injury inflicted upon him
by his successor attorney is impermissibly inconsistent with firmly established public policies. The mere fact that a tortfeasor is also an attorney does not serve as a valid justification for courts to confer upon
him an immunity from liability when the alleged benefits to be derived
from that immunity are illusory and misperceived. Our judicial system
can ill afford the preservation of a privileged protection from responsibility for members of the legal profession.

Andrea Jean Wooten
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